



# Practical Data-Only Attack Generation

Brian Johannesmeyer, Asia Slowinska, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida




































Victim server		
Data		
func_ptr: &foo		
Execution		














































Victim server			
Data			
cgi_bin: "/usr/cgi-bin" 			
Execution			













Victim server			
Data			
cgi_bin: "/usr/cgi-bin" 			
Execution			


Data-only	
attack!	Victim server
	Data
	cgi_bin: "/usr/cgi-bin" 
	Execution













# The attack does not corrupt the victim's control flow.


## The attack does not corrupt the victim's control flow.

## The attack does not corrupt the victim's control flow.

# It only corrupts *its function arguments*.







<pre>static server_socket * server_oneshot_getsock(server *srv, sock_addr *cnt_addr) {</pre>	\$1
<pre>server_socket *srv_socket, *srv_socket_wild = NULL;</pre>	
<pre>for (uint32_t i = 0; i &lt; srv-&gt;srv_sockets.used; ++i) {</pre>	
<pre>srv_socket = srv-&gt;srv_sockets.ptr[i];</pre>	
if (!sock_addr_is_port_eq(&srv_socket->addr,cnt_addr)) continue;	
<pre>if (sock_addr_is_addr_eq(&amp;srv_socket-&gt;addr,cnt_addr)) return srv_socket;</pre>	
<pre>if (NULL != srv_socket_wild) continue;</pre>	
if (sock_addr_is_addr_wildcard(&srv_socket->addr)) {	
<pre>srv_socket_wild = srv_socket;</pre>	
}	
}	
if (NULL != srv_socket_wild) {	
return srv_socket_wild;	
<pre>} else if (srv-&gt;srv_sockets.used) {</pre>	
<pre>return srv-&gt;srv_sockets.ptr[0];</pre>	
} else {	
<pre>log_error(srv-&gt;errh,FILE_,LINE_, "no sockets configured"); return NULL;</pre>	
	}
	st
1	



tatic void server\_sockets\_set\_event (server \*srv, int event) { for (uint32 t i = 0; i < srv->srv sockets.used; ++i) { server\_socket \*srv\_socket = srv->srv\_sockets.ptr[i]; fdevent\_fdnode\_event\_set(srv->ev, srv\_socket->fdn, event);

#### \_st \* const r, plugin\_data \* const p) { Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 9110

.access allow->used) , LINE, ch any from access\_allow %s",

LINE .

ss\_deny %s",

mod\_access\_merge\_config(&p->conf, p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]);

for (int i = 1, used = p->nconfig; i < used; ++i) {</pre>

if (config\_check\_cond(r, (uint32\_t)p->cvlist[i].k\_id))

#### Updates: 3864 Published: June 2022 ISSN: 2070-1721

STD: 97

Obsoletes: 2818, 7230, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694 Category: Standards Track

#### R. Fielding, Ed. Adobe M. Nottingham, Ed. Fastly J. Reschke, Ed. greenbytes

HTTP Semantics

#### Abstract


The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless applicationlevel protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core rotocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.

his document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.


#### us of This Memo

his is an Internet Standards Track document.


This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.






















difficult

10




return!0<t?t<3?crypt(-79,-13,a+crypt(-87,1-\_,crypt(-86,0,a+1)+a)): 1,t<\_?crypt(t+1,\_a):3;crypt(-94,-27+t,a)&&t=2?\_<13? crypt(2,+1,"%s %d &d\n"):9:16:t<8?t<-72?crypt(\_t, "@n'\*,#'/\*{\u+\wtcdnr/+,{r/xde}+,/%{\*+,/w{\$\u03eth},/#t,/n(n+,/+#n+,/#\ ;#qfn+,/+k#;+\*,/'r :'d\*'3,}{\u03etk w'K'.'+2#'}dq#'1 }(n1!/n(n#'; r{#w'r nc(n1)'/#{l,+'K {nu' iK};[(n1]'/wdg#n'wK nu' \ imk(KK{n1]//4{`\u03etk' i; :{n1'/\*{q#'d}r'}}fn\u03etb/2de'1 \ ;;{n1'-{}ru'/+,}##'##:mc(n1)'/#{l,+'K {nu' iK};[(n1]'/wdg#n'wK nu' \ imk(KK{n1]//4{`\u03etk' i; :{n1'/\*{q#'d}r'}fn\u03etb/2de'1 \ ;;{n1'-{}ru'/+,}##'##mc(,\*mu'/+kd'u+);#'rdq#u'n'/ ')+rt#'rt#'n' \ ?'+}##'!/!'':t<-50?\_==#a?putchar(31[a]):crypt(-65,\_a)+1):crypt((\*a='/')+t,\_a)+1) :@<t?crypt(2,2,"%s"):\*a=''][crypt(0,crypt(-61,\*a)






return!%tid="content in the set of the set of










return!%tid="content in the set of the set of












How data-only attacks **can be** 











**Which** data to overwrite?


**Which** data to overwrite?


















 Which data to overwrite?


 Use dynamic taint analysis
































## **Evaluation: Setup**

#### **Evaluation: Setup**

Target applications:




Target applications:



Target applications:



Workloads:



Target applications:

Workloads: Each application's test suite

Syscall	Total covered	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data <i>verbatim</i> )							
		Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
execve	11	7 (86%)	7 (86%)	7 (86%)					

Syscall	Total covered	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data <i>verbatim</i> )							
		Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
execve	11	7 (86%)	7 (86%)	7 (86%)					

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		Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
execve	11	7 (86%) pathname	7 (86%) argv	7 (86%) envp					

Syscall	Total covered	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)							
		Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
execve	11	7(86%) pathname	7 (86%) argv	7 (86%) envp					

After initialization, programs typically copy **strings** around **verbatim**.

o "	Total	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)						
Syscall	covered	Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6	
execve	11	7 (86%) pathname	7 (86%) argv	7 (86%) envp				
mmap	787	55 (5%)	441 (8%)	55	16 (100%)	17	73	
mprotect	144	97 (68%)	98 (27%)	1	Af	ter initializati	on	
mremap	11	11	7	11		programs typically copy		
pwrite64	1270	1217 (3%)	741 (47%)	399 (19%)	506 (36 <b>st</b>	strings around verbatim		
pwritev	10	10 (100%)	10 (10%)	-	10 (20%)			
sendfile	1	-	-	1	1			
sendmmsg	2	2	2	-	-			
sendmsg	12	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	-				
sendto	431	389 (7%)	410 (38%)	408 (6%)	-	-	-	
write	3083	768 (74%)	2877 (91%)	1265 (10%)				
writev	754	244 (18%)	742 (76%)	-			15	

o "	Total	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)							
Syscall	covered	Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
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mmap	787	55 (5%)	441 (8%)	55	16 (100%)	17	73		
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pwritev	10	10 (100%)	10 (10%)	-	10 (20%)				
sendfile	1	-	-	1	1				
sendmmsg	2	2	2	-	-				
sendmsg	12	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	-					
sendto	431	389 (7%)	410 (38%)	408 (6%)	-	-	-		
write	3083	768 (74%)	2877 (91%)	1265 (10%)					
writev	754	244 (18%)	742 (76%)	-			15		

<b>a</b> "	Total	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)							
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mmap	787	55 (5%)	441 (8%)	55	16 (100%	) 17	73		
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sendfile	1	-	-	1	1				
sendmmsg	2	2	2	-	- (				
sendmsg	12	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	-		Many types of syscalls offer many <b>primitives</b> t			
sendto	431	389 (7%)	410 (38%)	408 (6%)	-	an attacker.			
write	3083	768 (74%)	2877 (91%)	1265 (10%)					
writev	754	244 (18%)	742 (76%)	-			15		


	Total	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)						
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execve	11	7 (86%) pathname	7 (86%) argv	7 (86%) envp				
mmap	787	55 (5%)	441 (8%)	55	16 (100%	b) 17	73	
mprotect	144	97 (68%)	98 (27%)	1	(	After initializati	ion	
mremap	11	11	7	11	-	programs typically copy		
pwrite64	1270	1217 (3%)	741 (47%)	399 (19%)	506 (36 <sup>4</sup>			
pwritev	10	10 (100%)	10 (10%)	-	10 (20%)	)		
sendfile	1	-	-	1	1			
sendmmsg	2	2	2	-	- (			
sendmsg	12	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	-		Many types of offer many <b>pri</b>	•	
sendto	431	389 (7%)	410 (38%)	408 (6%)	-	an attacker.		
write	3083	768 (74%)	2877 (91%)	1265 (10%)				
writev	754	244 (18%)	742 (76%)	-			15	


•	Total	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)							
Syscall	covered	Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
execve	11	7 (86%) pathname	7 (86%) argv	7 (86%)					
mmap	787	55 (5%)	441 (8%)	55	16 (100%)	) 17	73		
mprotect	144	97 (68%)	98 (27%)	1		After initialization, programs typically copy <b>strings</b> around <b>verbatim</b> .			
mremap	11	11	7	11					
pwrite64	1270	1217 (3%)	741 (47%)	399 (19%)	506 (36				
pwritev	10	10 (100%)	10 (10%)	-	10 (20%)				
sendfile	1	-	-	1	1				
sendmmsg	2	2	2	-	-	Manutunaa of			
sendmsg	12	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	-		Many types of offer many <b>pri</b>	•		
sendto	431	389 (7%)	410 (38%)	408 (6%)	-	an attacker.			
write	3083	768 (74%)	2877 (91%)	1265 (10%)					
writev	754	244 (18%)	742 (76%)	-			15		


•	Total	Total attacker-tainted args. (% that are copied from attacker-controllable data verbatim)							
Syscall	covered	Arg. 1	Arg. 2	Arg. 3	Arg. 4	Arg. 5	Arg. 6		
execve	11	7 (86%) pathname	7 (86%) argv	7 (86%)					
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mprotect	144	97 (68%)	98 (27%)	1		After initialization, programs typically copy <b>strings</b> around <b>verbatim</b> .			
mremap	11	11	7	11	-				
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























#### **Control-flow hijacking attacks**





#### **Control-flow hijacking attacks**




Code pointer
















## Data-only attacks



## **Data-only attacks**


Any string Any number Any boolean



# Data-only attacksImage: Displaying stringAny stringAny numberAny store


. . .

Any cond. branch



# Data-only attacksImage: Display the systemImage: Display the systemImage

. . .




#### **Data-only attacks** Any string Any syscall

. . .

Any number Any boolean

. . .

Any store Any cond. branch




## **Data-only attacks**

Any string Any number Any boolean

Any syscall Any store Any cond. branch

. . .





Any string

. . .


Any number

Any boolean

**Data-only attacks** 

#### Any syscall Any store Any cond. branch

. . .





### We present Einstein, a **data-only attack** generator.



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### It builds **hundreds of exploits** against popular web servers.



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## It builds **hundreds of exploits** against popular web servers.



We call upon researchers and vendors to **rethink mitigation strategies**.